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REFLECTIONS ON THE ACCIDENT AT
MILLER PARK AND THE PROSECUTION
OF WORK-RELATED FATALITIES
IN WISCONSIN
EDWARD A. FALLoNE*
I. THE ACCIDENT AT MILLER PARK
On July 14, 1999, a large construction crane known as "Big Blue"
collapsed as workers rushed to complete the new home of the Milwau-
kee Brewers baseball team in time for the 2000 season.' Jeffrey Wischer,
William DeGrave, and Jerome Starr died when Big Blue fell into the
partially constructed stadium during a lift, dropping a 450-ton section of
the ballpark's retractable roof.2 The three ironworkers had been guiding
the roof section into place from an aerial basket suspended from a sepa-
rate crane.3 They were killed when the collapse of Big Blue knocked
their own basket to the ground. The accident caused approximately $100
million in damage to the partially completed structure and delayed the
completion of the project for one year.4 The widows of the three men
brought a wrongful death suit against the company that leased Big Blue
and its crew to the construction site, Lampson International Ltd., as well
as against the company responsible for constructing the retractable roof
of the stadium, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries.5
* Associate Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School. The author wishes to
thank the editors of the Marquette Sports Law Review for their patience and their contribu-
tions to this essay.
1. Kenneth R. Lamke, $99 Million; Miller Park Ruling Apparently a Record, MILWAUKEE
J. SENTINEL, Dec. 2, 2000, at Al. With a boom length of 567 feet, Big Blue was the second
tallest structure in Milwaukee. Steve Thomas, Big Blue: Hard Lessons to Learn, LIFrLINK.
COM, at http://www.liftlink.con/index2.cfm?articleID=1279 (last visited Oct. 31, 2001). By co-
incidence, an inspection team from the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) happened to be videotaping the lift at the time of the accident. The video of the
collapse can be viewed on the internet at http:llwww.channel3000.comlVideo/collapseOO0113.
ram.
2. Lamke, supra note 1, at Al.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. A third corporate defendant who had designed and manufactured Big Blue, the Neal F.
Lampson Company (which is also the parent company of Lampson International), was dis-
missed from the suit prior to verdict. Lampson Co. Dismissed from Crane Case, THE
MILWAUKEECHANNEL.COM, (Nov. 27, 2000), at http://www.themilwaukeechannel.com/sh/
news/wisconsin/stories/news-wisconsin-20001127-182912.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2001). An-
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During construction, the roof sections were first assembled outside of
the stadium. The procedures followed by Mitsubishi called for the sec-
tions to be lifted by the crew of Big Blue to a height of approximately
330 feet, rotated over the outer wall of the stadium and any previously
installed roof sections, and lowered into place at a height of 230 feet.6
On the day of the accident, the crane had been moved into place for the
lift on its tank-like tracks. The surface area of the section of roof being
lifted by Big Blue that day was equivalent to three and one half wings of
a 747 airliner.7 These dimensions made the roof section act like a sail in
the wind, exerting pressure on the crane's boom and ultimately tipping
the crane.8
At trial, expert witnesses placed the maximum safe wind speed for an
attempted lift of a roof section of this size at eleven miles per hour.9 The
plaintiffs introduced testimony indicating that wind gusts at the top of
the stadium construction site reached thirty miles per hour on the day of
the accident. There was also testimony to the effect that several iron-
workers had expressed concern about the wind prior to the lift."° Both
plaintiff's attorneys and co-defendant Lampson International argued
that the accident occurred because Mitsubishi Heavy Industries failed to
other company, Danny's Construction Company Inc., was the ironworker subcontractor that
hired and supervised the three workers who were killed. Danny's Construction Company was
cited by OSHA for safety violations that contributed to the accident but was not named as a
defendant in the wrongful death lawsuit. Kenneth R.Lamke, Deal Reached in Miller Park
Lawsuit: General Contractor to Pay $2 Million in Partial Settlement, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL,
Jan. 18, 2000, at B1.
6. Thomas, supra note 1, at http://www.liftlink.com/index2.cfm?articlelD=1279.
7. Expert: Wind, Poor Choices Caused Crash, THEMILWAUKEECHANNEL.COM (Oct. 27,
2000) at http://www.themilwaukeechannel.comlshlnews/wisconsinlstorieslnews-wisconsin-
20001026-211024.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2001) [hereinafter Expert].
8. OSHA issued citations for workplace safety violations against Mitsubishi Heavy Indus-
tries, Lampson International, and Danny's Construction Company as a result of the accident,
and imposed penalties of $240,500, $131,300, and $168,000 respectively. OSHA Cites Subcon-
tractors in Miller Park Fatal Crane Collapse, Milwaukee, OSHA Regional News Release (Jan.
12, 2000), at http:l/www.osha.govlmedialoshnewsljanOO/reg5-20000112a.html (last visited Oct.
31, 2001). For its part, Mitsubishi was cited for willful violations arising from the fateful lift on
three grounds: exceeding the crane's rated load, failing to keep workers clear of the suspended
load, and hoisting workers during unsafe weather conditions. Id. "Willful" violations are ones
committed with an intentional disregard for or plain indifference to the Occupational Health
and Safety Act and its regulations. Id. Mitsubishi was also cited for several serious violations,
one of which was the failure to factor in wind conditions during crane operation. Id. A "seri-
ous" violation is "one in which there is a substantial probability that death or serious physical
charm could result from a hazardous condition, and that the employer knew or should have
known of the hazard." Id.
9. Expert, supra note 7, at http:l/www.themilwaukeechannel.comlshlnewslwisconsinlsto-
ries/news-wisconsin-20001026-211024.html.
10. Thomas, supra note 1, at http://www.liftlink.com/index2.cfm?articlelD=1279.
[Vol. 12:105
ACCIDENT AT MILLER PARK
properly monitor wind gusts on the day of the lift and ignored warnings
that conditions were unsafe.
Mitsubishi, for its part, argued in defense that it was Lampson Inter-
national's responsibility to monitor wind speed.' Mitsubishi also argued
during the trial that Lampson International failed to provide Mitsubishi
with clear or sufficiently detailed warnings concerning the effect of wind
speed on suspended loads.' 2 Finally, Mitsubishi introduced testimony
that blamed the accident on contributing factors in addition to the wind
conditions, such as unstable soil underneath the crane and on a defect in
the crane's assembly that left Big Blue susceptible to collapse.' 3
However, much of the testimony at trial centered on the actions of
Victor Grotlisch, who was the site supervisor for Mitsubishi Heavy In-
dustries. Grotlisch was clearly singled out by the plaintiffs as the person
most responsible for the accident. On the stand, Grotlisch admitted that
he did not make sure that "wind-sail" calculations were performed prior
to ordering the lift to proceed. 4 Other witnesses testified that Grotlisch
clashed often with the Lampson crew assigned to operate Big Blue, to
the point that Mitsubishi demanded and obtained the replacement of
11. Lawyer: Miller Park Crash Was Preventable, THEMILWAUKEECHAINL.COM (Oct. 18,
2000) at http:llwww.themilwaukeechannel.comlshlnewslwisconsinlstories/news-wisconsin-
20001018-115935.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2001) [hereinafter Lawyer].
12. Expert Says Lampson at Fault in Big Blue Crash, THEMILWAUKEECHANNEL.COM
(Nov. 16, 2000), at http:llwww.themilwaukeechannel.com/sh/newslwisconsinlstorieslnews-wis-
consin-20001116-134004.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2001) [hereinafter Expert Says Lampson at
Fault].
13. After the collapse, a broken water main was discovered within 20 feet of the crane.
Mitsubishi argued that the water main ruptured prior to the accident and rendered the sur-
rounding soil unstable. Thomas, supra note 1, at http://www.liftlink.com/index2.cfm?article
ID=1279. Mitsubishi also argued that a "spacer" or washer of unknown origin was installed as
part of the crane's kingpin assembly, and that the collapse occurred when this spacer failed.
Expert: Big Blue Assembled Correctly, THEMILwAUKEECHANNEL.COM (Nov. 20, 2000), at
http://www.themilwaukeechanneI.com/sh/news/wisconsin/stories/ news-wisconsin-20001120-
195345.html. This latter argument was effectively countered by Bernard Ross, witness for
Lampson International, who testified forcefully that the crane had been assembled properly
and that "[t]he reason for this accident is an abuse of operating procedure and running the
crane in winds that are well in excess of that what was contemplated for the crane." Crash
Blamed on Poor Handling of Crane, THE MILWAUKEECHANNL.COM (Nov. 21,2000) at http:ll
www.themilwaukeechannel.com/sh/news/wisconsin/stories/news-wisconsin-20001121-192604.
html (last visited Oct. 31, 2001) [hereinafter Poor Handling].
14. Lamke, supra note 1, at Al. Under questioning by the plaintiffs' lawyer, Grotlisch
admitted on the stand that he had "dropped the ball" in failing to make sure that wind speed
calculations were performed more recently than two hours prior to the lift. Supervisor Admits
Fault in Fatal Crane Collapse, APBrNws.CoM (Oct. 24, 2000), at http://www.apbnews.com/
newscenterlbreakingnews2000/10/241cranelO24_01.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2001). He testi-
fied that he had assumed that the Lampson crew had performed the calculations. Id.
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one Lampson crewmember.' 5 Grotlisch was portrayed by witnesses as
both "sloppy" in his approach to safety and "authoritarian" in his re-
sponse to subordinates who expressed concerns about the safety proce-
dures.16 Weather had delayed several previous lifts in the weeks prior to
the accident, putting pressure on Mitsubishi to pick up the pace of con-
struction.17 The plaintiffs also introduced evidence suggesting that after
the collapse Grotlisch may have unplugged the construction site's
weather computer, in an effort to eliminate a precise record of the wind
speed at the time of the accident.18
On December 1, 2000, the jury returned its unanimous verdict.' 9
Mitsubishi was found to be 97% negligent in its operations at the time of
the accident, most likely due to its failure to properly monitor wind
speed during the attempted lift.2" Lampson International was found to
be 3% negligent, presumably because Mitsubishi argued that the direc-
tions for operating the crane were unclear.21 The jurors responded nega-
tively to questions in the verdict form that asked whether the employees
of Lampson International who were operating Big Blue at the time of
the accident were negligent. 22 Neither Victor Grotlisch nor any other
employee of Mitsubishi was named in the verdict.23
The jurors awarded $1.4 million to each of the widows for pain and
suffering, as well as $350,000 apiece for loss of companionship.21 In ad-
dition, Mitsubishi was ordered to pay punitive damages to the three wo-
men in the amount of $94 million .2  The total of over $99 million in
15. Lamke, supra note 1, at Al. See also Testimonies Focus on Safety, Weather,
THEMILWAUKEECHANNEL.COM (Oct. 20, 2000), at http://www.themilwaukeechannel.com/sh/
news/wisconsin/stories/news-wisconsin-20001020-202952.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2001).
16. Lamke, supra note 1, at Al. See also Erik Gunn, Crane Owner Says Mitsubishi Made
Fateful Decisions on Lift, ENG'G NEws-RECORD (Nov. 27, 2000), at http:/lwww.enr.com/news/
newsll2700b.asp (last visited Oct. 31, 2001).
17. Thomas, supra note 1, at http://www.liftlink.com/index2cfm?articlelD=1279. Under
the construction contract, general contractor HCH Joint Venture would have been eligible for
over $1 million in bonuses if the stadium was completed in time for opening day of the 2000
baseball season. Id.
18. Lamke, supra note 1, at Al.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. The verdict also stated that the terms of the lease between Lampson International
and Mitsubishi required Mitsubishi to indemnify Lampson for any liabilities incurred as a
result of the construction project. Id. Therefore, Mitsubishi must ultimately bear the cost of
the entire amount of compensatory damages. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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damages is believed to be a record for a personal injury case in Wiscon-
sin.26 The verdict is currently on appeal.'
Representatives of the Milwaukee County District Attorney's Office
attended each day of the trial in order to evaluate possible criminal
charges against the parties responsible for the collapse of Big Blue.28
The Chief Investigator for the Milwaukee County D.A.'s Office was
quoted as saying that the office was "looking to see if somebody was
reckless in their actions and put somebody in harm's way."'29 Prior to the
conclusion of the civil trial, the Milwaukee County Sheriffs Office had
stated that its own investigation pointed to a structural failure as the
cause of the collapse, making criminal charges unlikely.30 However, the
jury clearly rejected structural failure as a contributing factor in the acci-
dent when it returned its verdict. Therefore, the filing of criminal
charges against Mitsubishi and/or others is still possible. As of October
2001, no criminal charges have been brought.3
26. Id.
27. Kenneth R. Lamke, Stadium Insurers Called Liable, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Aug. 7,
2001, at B1. On August 6, 2001, Circuit Judge Dominic Amato ruled that the five insurance
companies that underwrote the construction project were liable for the jury verdict under the
terms of the policies. Id. The judge concluded that the verdict reflected a finding that Mitsub-
ishi was negligent in displaying an "intentional disregard" for the creation of a safe workplace.
However, Judge Amato ruled that Mitsubishi's failure to maintain a safe workplace did not
rise to the level of an intent to injure the three ironworkers that died. Id. Negligent acts were
covered by Mitsubishi's insurance, while intentional acts were excluded from the terms of the
policy coverage. Id. Therefore, in considering the appeal of the damages awarded to the
three widows, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals will have before it two conflicting arguments.
Mitsubishi is arguing on appeal that the conduct leading to the accident did not justify the
imposition of punitive damages, while the insurers will pursue their argument that Mitsubishi
engaged in intentional acts that "bordered on [the] criminal." Elizabeth Amon, Insurers Still
Owe in Crane Case, NAT'L LJ., Aug. 20, 2001, at A4 (quoting plaintiff's attorney Robert
Habush).
28. Miller Park Accident Case Goes to Jury, MILWAUKEE Bus. J., (Nov. 29, 2000), availa-
ble at http://milwaukee.bcentral.comlmilwaukee/stories/200011/27/daily3O.html. See also
Kenneth R. Lamke, Construction Firms Point Fingers at Each Other, MILWAUKEE J. SENTI-
NEL, Oct. 19,2000, at B1 (noting the attendance of the District Attorney E. Michael McCann
during opening statements of the trial).
29. Greg J. Borowski, Workers Argued About Safety of Lift, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL,
July 16, 1999, at Al (quoting Richard Heath).
30. Kenneth R. Lamke & Steve Schultze, Charges in Crane Collapse Called Unlikely, Mai-
WAUKEE J. SENTINEL, July 27, 1999, at Al.
31. Despite the passage of time since the accident occurred, criminal charges may still be
brought. In a previous prosecution, District Attorney E. Michael McCann brought reckless
homicide charges against a construction contractor that was ultimately held responsible for
the deaths of three workers in a 1988 methane gas explosion at the site of Milwaukee's deep
tunnel sewer project. Those criminal charges came some 20 months after the accident oc-
curred. Id.
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This essay will examine whether the circumstances of the Big Blue
accident would support a criminal indictment against Mitsubishi Heavy
Industries upon charges of either reckless homicide or homicide by the
negligent operation of a vehicle under the Wisconsin Criminal Code.
The possible application of criminal charges to the accident provides an
opportunity to reevaluate the use of criminal sanctions generally against
corporate defendants arising out of work-site fatalities. This essay will
argue that the creation of an unsafe work environment that evidences
the employer's disregard for the life of its employees should properly
give rise to charges of reckless homicide. However, it is inappropriate
for prosecutors to use the charge of homicide by negligent operation of a
vehicle to prosecute employers for work-site accidents arising out of a
one time misjudgment or miscalculation that leads to fatalities. Accom-
plishing such disparate results under these two separate statutes will re-
quire both judicial and legislative action.
II. THE CHARGE OF RECKLESS HOMICIDE IN THE WAKE OF
WORK-RELATED FATALITIES
The paradigm of a prosecution brought against a corporate defen-
dant for the reckless homicide of an employee is a 1990 Illinois case
called People v. O'Neil,32 which involved a corporation called Film Re-
covery Systems, Incorporated. The company engaged in the recovery of
silver metal from used film chips by immersing the chips in a sodium
cyanide solution.33 Workers at the plant mixed the solution in open vats,
stirred in the film chips, removed the saturated chips, and cleaned the
tanks.34 The vats had no hoods to control the emission of noxious fumes,
the workers had no protective clothing and only flimsy paper masks, and
the plant itself was poorly ventilated.35 Management did not inform the
workers, many of whom were illegal immigrants, about the dangers of
inhaling cyanide gas or absorbing cyanide through the skin.36 The only
warning sign in the plant stated the single word "poison" in both English
and Spanish; there was evidence that the skull and crossbones symbol
had been removed from the cyanide vats.37 Stefan Golab, a 59-year-old
illegal Polish immigrant who spoke no English, became ill from inhaling
32. 550 N.E.2d 1090 (Il. App. Ct. 1990).
33. Kathleen F. Brickey, Death in the Workplace: Corporate Liability for Criminal Honi-
cide, 2 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & Pun. POL'Y 753, 771 (1987).
34. Id. at 771-72.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 772.
37. Id. at 772-73.
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fumes while working at the plant and went into convulsions." He died
before he could be transported to the hospital.
39
Illinois prosecutors charged Film Recovery Systems and individual
members of its management with involuntary manslaughter in Mr. Go-
lab's death, and with recklessly endangering the lives of other workers.40
The judge that tried the case concluded that the individual defendants
operated the plant with the knowledge that their procedures created a
strong probability of death or serious injury, and that Film Recovery Sys-
tems, Inc. recklessly tolerated this mismanagement. 4 All of the defend-
ants, including the corporation, were convicted. The District Attorney's
office in Milwaukee made note of the Film Recovery Systems conviction
and began a policy of investigating every work-site fatality in Milwaukee
County in light of a possible criminal prosecution.42
The crime of first degree reckless homicide under Wisconsin Statutes
Section 940.02 states "[w]hoever recklessly causes the death of another
human being under circumstances which show utter disregard for human
life is guilty of a Class B felony."43 A defendant acts with criminal reck-
lessness under this section when "the actor creates an unreasonable and
substantial risk of death or great bodily harm to another human being
and the actor is aware of that risk."'44 This is a subjective mental state.
The element of an "utter disregard for human life" is an aggravating
factor that increases the penalty over that imposed for second degree
reckless homicide.45 This last element is "measured objectively, on the
basis of what a reasonable person in the [actor's] position would have
known. "46
The first significant prosecution of a corporate defendant for reckless
homicide in Milwaukee County involved the deaths of three workers in-
volved in the construction of Milwaukee's "deep tunnel" sewer project.
The S.A. Healy Company was contracted to construct tunnels beneath
the south side of Milwaukee in order to better control the flow of water
into Lake Michigan.47 The Sewage Commission, which was supervising
38. Id. at 756, 771.
39. Id. at 756.
40. Id. at 769-70.
41. Id. at 774.
42. E. Michael McCann, Judges, Jurors and Organized Labor: Four Perspectives of Corpo-
rate Citizenship, 84 MARQ. L. Rlv. 782, 793 (2001).
43. Wis. STAT. § 940.02 (2000).
44. Wis. STAT. § 939.24 (2000).
45. State v. Jensen, 613 N.W.2d 170, 174 (Wis. 2000).
46. Id. at 174.
47. McCann, supra note 42, at 794.
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the construction, specifically warned all of the contractors working on
the project that methane gas had been detected in some of the tunnels.
The contractors were told that if workers encountered readings indicat-
ing that gas was present they must immediately cease any and all opera-
tion of machinery at the risk of an explosion."4 One day, methane gas
was detected in the tunnel and the work crews immediately ceased oper-
ation and left the tunnel. However, rather than waiting a full hour
before rechecking for the presence of gas, as required by the Sewage
Commission, the S.A. Healy crew chief went back in the tunnel with two
workers.49 Presumably they were intending to clean out a machine used
to affix concrete to the tunnel walls, out of a concern that the concrete
inside the machine would likely set and the machine would be ruined.5"
When the three workers turned on the machine to clean it there was a
spark and an explosion. All three were killed. The District Attorney's
Office successfully prosecuted the S.A. Healy Company for two counts
of reckless homicide arising out of the accident.5
Another notable prosecution of a corporation for reckless homicide
in Milwaukee County is unusual in that it did not involve a workplace
fatality. The District Attorney's Office brought reckless homicide
charges against the Chem-Bio Corporation, which operated a laboratory
that evaluated Pap smear slides under a contract with an HMO.5 2
Chem-Bio paid its Pap smear readers by the number of slides that they
evaluated, which led to the readers evaluating slides in a rapid manner
and in a number far in excess of industry standards.53 At least two slides
were misread as a result, and cancer that should have been diagnosed
early on went undetected.54 Two women died, but not before one of the
patients in the terminal phase of her disease personally requested that
the D.A. bring criminal charges of homicide upon her death." On the
eve of trial, Chem-Bio pled no contest to two counts of reckless
homicide.56
These three fact scenarios fall into a common pattern. Corporate
managers did not intend for anyone to die, and they may not have
48. Id.
49. Id. at 794.
50. Id. at 795.
51. Id. The District Attorney did not charge the company in the death of the crew chief
whose recklessness had led to the accident. Id.
52. Id. at 795.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 796.
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known with certainty that death would result from their conduct. How-
ever, the business practices adopted by the managers flew in the face of a
known and substantial risk, making death or serious injury an almost
inevitable consequence of the manner in which the company did busi-
ness. Film Recovery Systems placed workers into an extremely hazard-
ous situation without any warning, training, or protection. The crew
chief of the S.A. Healy Company ordered workers to place themselves in
the path of a known and substantial danger that was unrelated to their
construction duties. Finally, while the Chem-Bio Corporation did not
put its own employees at risk, the company did encourage and tolerate
procedures that significantly undermined the accuracy of the diagnostic
work their employees performed even though management had knowl-
edge of the likely consequences. In each case, there also appears to be
an "utter disregard for human life" inherent in the choices made by the
corporate managers.
Construction accidents resulting in worker fatalities can be quite dif-
ferent from the above model. A construction site, by its nature, is a dan-
gerous and highly complex environment. Workers do their job at high
altitudes and in close proximity to heavy machinery. The risk of injury is
known and recognized by managers and workers alike, and countless
calculated risks are taken during the course of the project.
In discussing the failure of management in the Film Recovery Sys-
tems case to take steps to protect its employees, Professor Kathleen
Brickey distinguished their reckless conduct from the conduct of em-
ployers who place employees in necessary danger due to the nature of
their work:
Consider a construction site, for example. There is at least a sub-
stantial risk (if not a probability) that one of the construction
workers at a high-rise building site will be killed or seriously in-
jured on the job, and that risk is clearly known and understood by
the construction company's management. Does it therefore fol-
low that the managers are forever in peril of criminal prosecution
for the foreseen (or at least foreseeable) death or injury when it
occurs?
The answer, of course, is no. As a general matter, employees
are deemed to assume the ordinary risks inherent in the nature of
their work. When the market functions as we expect it to, they
will have taken the risks into consideration when they arrange
their compensation. The construction workers with whose fate
we are concerned are paid to assume commensurately greater
2001]
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risks, and their employers presumably have an interest in protect-
ing them from injury. 7
Compare this analysis with the conduct of the crew chief in the S.A.
Healy case, who knowingly ordered his employees to enter the tunnel
despite the presence of methane gas. That is not a risk that the construc-
tion workers considered or accepted as a natural part of their
employment.
This is not to argue that corporations should enjoy absolute immunity
from prosecution for workplace fatalities. However, criminal liability
should not be imposed due to an error of judgment in performing a com-
plex and dangerous task or on the basis of the miscalculation of a risk
known and accepted by the workers. Chem-Bio Corporation was not
prosecuted because its employees misread a slide, but because its corpo-
rate practices made it inevitable that slides would be misread. If the
Miller Park construction site was knowingly run in a dangerous and slip-
shod manner, so as to make a fatal accident foreseeable, then manage-
ment and the corporate contractor responsible should be held
accountable for creating such a situation in disregard of the conse-
quence. On the other hand, if the crane collapse was caused by an iso-
lated instance of an error in judgment or a failure to appreciate the risks
associated with one particular lift, then the accident is not the result of
management's indifference to human life.
If Mitsubishi ran the lift operations using procedures that evidenced
a total disregard for the safety of workers, then it is highly unlikely that
the unionized construction crews would have tolerated such conditions.
It appears that Mitsubishi and its on-site supervisor Victor Grotlisch did
not, in fact, recognize the full extent of the danger present in attempting
the lift attempted on July 14, 1999. Several factors appear to have con-
tributed to Mitsubishi's failure to fully comprehend the risk. The ab-
sence of procedures to adequately account for wind speed appears to
have played a predominate role. However, the angle chosen for the lift
(which required a higher lift and thus subjected the load to greater wind-
sail conditions) also created a more dangerous situation than Mitsubishi
recognized. Poor communication and unclear lines of authority between
Mitsubishi and Lampson employees also prevented Mitsubishi from rec-
ognizing the true extent of the danger. Finally, the authoritarian man-
agement style of Victor Grotlisch appears to have stifled dissenting views
and prevented worker concerns from being fully expressed.
57. Brickey, supra note 33, at 785-86.
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Certainly Mitsubishi did not satisfy the standard of care that a rea-
sonable contractor would have exercised in performing such a dangerous
maneuver. But the evidence does not appear to support the conclusion
that Mitsubishi proceeded with the lift in the face of a subjective knowl-
edge that conditions made the lift unsafe. A charge of reckless homicide
under such facts appears unlikely.
III. AN ALTERNATIVE CHARGE: HOMICIDE BY THE NEGLIGENT
OPERATION OF A VEHICLE
Big Blue was a self-propelled piece of construction equipment that
operated on tank-like tracks. Therefore, prosecutors have the option of
charging Mitsubishi under the statute governing Homicide by Negligent
Operation of a Vehicle. Section 940.10 of the Wisconsin Statutes states:
"Whoever causes the death of another human being by the negligent
operation or handling of a vehicle is guilty of a Class E felony."' 8 This
statute has been used in recent years by Wisconsin prosecutors to charge
corporate entities for fatalities caused by the employees of the corpora-
tion while operating a vehicle.
In 1991, prosecutors in Waukesha County brought charges under this
statute against a construction company when a backhoe operator acci-
dentally came into contact with live power lines, resulting in the electro-
cution of a fellow worker.59 Clark County prosecutors used the statute
in 1996 to charge a mobile home manufacturer for the death of three
bicyclists when an improperly attached trailer became unhitched from a
company tractor-trailer, allowing a mobile home to become disengaged
and strike the bicyclists.6" Finally, in 1999 the Waukesha County District
Attorney publicly flirted with filing charges under the statute against
Universal Metrics, Inc. after one of its employees got drunk at a com-
pany Christmas party and killed a woman whilst attempting to drive
home.6'
58. Wis. STAT. § 940.10 (2000).
59. State v. Richard Knutson, Inc., 537 N.W.2d 420, 421-422 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).
60. State v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 589 N.W.2d 668, 670-671 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998). At the
conclusion of an inquest examining the cause of the accident, a jury found probable cause to
charge the corporate defendant with two counts of second-degree reckless homicide under
Wisconsin Statutes Section 940.06. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 589 N.W.2d at 671. However, the
criminal information filed by the State charged the company with homicide by the negligent
operation of a vehicle. Id
61. Lisa Sink, Falls Firm Not Liable in Fatal Crash, MILWAUKEE J. SENTNEL, July 25,
2001, at 2B. After calling an inquest to examine the accident, Waukesha County District At-
torney Paul Bucher ultimately decided not to file charges. In a later civil proceeding the
2001]
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The attraction that this statute holds for prosecutors should be obvi-
ous. A conviction is possible upon a showing of criminal negligence on
the part of the operator of the vehicle. The prosecution need not prove
that the corporation's employees were reckless in their actions leading
up to the accident. The difference between criminal negligence and
recklessness has been succinctly described:
Criminal negligence involves the same degree of risk as criminal
recklessness - an unreasonable and substantial risk of death or
great bodily harm. The difference between the two is that reck-
lessness requires that the actor be subjectively aware of the risk,
while criminal negligence requires only that the actor should have
been aware of the risk - an objective standard.62
Therefore, the key focus is not on the state of mind of the defendant, but
rather on what a reasonable person in similar circumstances would have
known. In the case of Big Blue, prosecutors would not have to prove
that Mitsubishi employees acted in the face of a known risk when at-
tempting the lift in the absence of up-to-the minute wind speed data.
Rather they would merely have to prove that a reasonable person in
Mitsubishi's position would have known that proceeding with the lift
without performing wind-sail calculations created a substantial risk of
serious injury.
Filing charges on the basis of a work-site fatality might seem a stretch
for a statute seemingly designed to promote safety on state highways.
However, a "vehicle" is defined for purposes of the statute as "any self-
propelled device for moving persons or property or pulling implements
from one place to another, whether such device is operated on lands,
rails, water, or in the air."'63 Construction equipment falls within the lit-
eral language of the definition.64 Big Blue was certainly self-propelled,
and its crew had just moved it into position for the day's lift prior to the
accident.
A more difficult question, and the one addressed by the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals in State v. Richard Knutson, Inc.,65 is whether a corpo-
Wisconsin Court of Appeals ruled that the corporation enjoyed immunity as a "social host[ ]"
under state law and could not be sued by the family of the victim. Id.
62. Walter Dickey et al., The Importance of Clarity in the Law of Homicide: The Wiscon-
sin Revision, 1989 Wis. L. REv. 1323, 1377 (quoted in Richard Knutson, Inc., 537 N.W.2d at
428).
63. WIs. STAT. § 939.22(44) (2000). See also Steenberg Homes, Inc., 589 N.W.2d at 672.
64. See, e.g., Richard Knutson, Inc., 537 N.W.2d at 421 (corporation charged with negli-
gent vehicular homicide after backhoe operator inadvertently moved backhoe's boom into
contact with live electrical wires, electrocuting a crew member on the job).
65. 537 N.W.2d 420 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).
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ration (as opposed to a natural person) may be prosecuted under the
statutory language of section 940.10. The corporate defendant in that
case argued that the language of the statute - directed at "whoever"
causes the death of "another" human being - clearly limited the pool of
possible defendants to the universe of human beings. 6 The rules of
grammar suggest that the word "another" limits the class of possible de-
fendants to "human beings." Judge Anderson, writing for the court, was
unpersuaded by grammatical arguments alone. Because the word "who-
ever" is nowhere defined in the statute, the court found that it was am-
biguous whether the term should be read to include or exclude artificial
persons from its definition.67
Therefore, the court turned to an examination of legislative intent.
The court noted that prior to the revision of the Criminal Code in 1955,
the comparable version of the crime was addressed to "any person," a
phrase that clearly encompassed corporations.68 The legislature gave no
reason for this change. In addition, the court noted that an earlier ver-
sion of the 1955 revision had explicitly addressed corporate criminal lia-
bility for the acts of its agents, but that this provision had been deleted
from the final version of the revision.69 The reporter for the revision of
the Criminal Code noted that the proposed provision on corporate liabil-
ity had been deleted upon the motion of a committee member who was
in-house counsel for a large industrial company, and that the 1955 revi-
sion was not intended to change the existing rule of law on the subject.7"
The court then turned to an examination of precedent in order to
determine what the existing legal rule was at the time of the 1955 revi-
sion. The court cited Vulcan Last Co. v. State7' for the proposition that a
corporation can be criminally liable under Wisconsin law.72 The court
also cited State ex rel. Kropf v. Gilbert73 for the proposition that a corpo-
ration can be held guilty of any crime that is punishable by a fine.74
Therefore, the court in Knutson concluded that the "well established"
rule in Wisconsin prior to 1955 was that if a crime was punishable by a
fine then a corporation could be held criminally responsible for that
66. Id. at 422.
67. Id. at 423.
68. Id. at 424.
69. Id.
70. Richard Knutson, Inc., 537 N.W.2d at 424 (citing William A. Platz, The Criminal Code,
1956 Wis. L. Rnv. 350, 362-63).
71. 217 N.W. 412 (Wis. 1928).
72. Richard Knutson, Inc., 537 N.W.2d at 424.
73. 251 N.W. 478 (Wis. 1933).
74. Richard Knutson, Inc., 537 N.W.2d at 424.
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crime.75 Since the legislature did not express an intention to change this
rule when it passed the 1955 revisions, the court reasoned that the legis-
lature intended to continue the rule unchanged.76 Notwithstanding the
plain language of the statute, the court held that corporations are proper
defendants under a charge of homicide by the negligent operation of a
vehicle. Under both the facts and the law, then, it appears that a crimi-
nal prosecution of Mitsubishi arising out of the collapse of Big Blue is
possible under this provision of the criminal code.
IV. THE RESULT IN KNUTSON IS WRONG
As an exercise in statutory interpretation, the opinion of the majority
in Knutson is just plain wrong. Judge Brown demonstrated this fact
when he convincingly brushed aside the majority's arguments in a well-
reasoned dissent. First, Judge Brown examined the state of the prece-
dent prior to 1955. He noted that the Vulcan Last Co. v. State7 7 opinion
involved a crime that prohibited "persons" from attempting to influence
a voter in any way.78 Therefore, the holding in that case was confined to
the question of whether the word "person" in a penal statute could reach
a corporate defendant.79
In the view of Judge Brown, the choice of the legislature to apply the
criminal statute to "whoever" causes the death of "another" human be-
ing through the negligent operation of a vehicle - rather than to direct
the statute towards "persons" - clearly evidenced the legislature's inten-
tion to exclude artificial persons from liability.8" The basic rules of
grammar dictate such a conclusion. Judge Brown notes that the Kropf
case does not alter this result. The actual holding of that case is that a
corporation can be held guilty of a crime when it is punishable by a fine,
not that it must be.81 The intent of the legislature remains the para-
mount consideration. In the absence of any settled pre-existing rule ex-
tending criminal liability to corporations in all cases without regard to
the language used in the statute, it is impossible to conclude that the
legislature's use of the word "whoever" in the revision of section 940.10
was intended to reach corporate actors.82
75. Id. at 425.
76. Id.
77. 217 N.W. 412 (Wis. 1928).
78. Id. at 429 (Brown, J., dissenting) (citing Vulcan Last Co., 217 N.W. at 413).
79. Id. at 429-430.
80. Id. at 430.
81. Id. at 431.
82. Richard Knutson, Inc., 537 N.W.2d at 430 (Brown, J., dissenting).
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Although Judge Brown does not make this argument, the legislative
history of the 1955 revision also supports the position that corporations
were not intended to be defendants under this crime. The fact that the
legislature changed the language describing the perpetrator of the crime
from "person" to "whoever" indicates an intention to change the scope
of liability. The additional fact that a proposed section of the revision
dealing with corporate liability was deleted during the drafting process
further supports this view. The concluding comments of Judge Brown
are worth considering:
What this debate really comes down to is whether it is desirable
that a court avoid the literal meaning of this statute. I acknowl-
edge that there exists a tension between the language of the stat-
ute and the announced public policy goal by some of our citizenry
that corporations be held to criminal liability for negligent deaths.
And I reject the notion that we should never search for the 'real'
rule lying behind the mere words on a printed page. But when
the statute's wording is so clear in its contextual rigidity, the stat-
ute has therefore generated an answer which excludes otherwise
eligible answers from consideration. Unlike the majority, I take
the clear wording of the statute seriously.83
V. CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR WORK-PLACE FATALITIES
ON THE GROUNDS OF NEGLIGENT OPERATION OF A
VEHICLE IS POOR POLICY
Not only is the holding in the Knutson case a misreading of the stat-
ute, but the Court of Appeals' ruling to permit corporate liability in such
circumstances also goes contrary to several strong policy arguments. The
first argument recognizes that the legislature should only criminalize
conduct that evidences a blameworthy state of mind. The essence of a
"crime" - indeed, the only characteristic of a crime that distinguishes it
from a civil sanction - is that it invokes the moral condemnation of the
community. 8 The mens rea element of a crime provides the justification
for a moral condemnation of the conduct. Clearly the intentional or
knowing infliction of harm upon another is morally blameworthy. In ad-
dition, "[i]f an individual knowingly takes a risk of a kind which the com-
munity condemns as plainly unjustifiable, then he is morally
blameworthy and can properly be adjudged a criminal."85
83. Id. at 432.
84. Henry A. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CoTrEMP. PROBS. 401,
404-05 (1958).
85. Id. at 416
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A charge of negligent operation of a vehicle does not impose liability
because the defendant acted in the face of a known risk (without regard
for the consequences). Instead, liability is imposed because the actor
unreasonably failed to appreciate the true nature of the risk and there-
fore failed to take adequate steps to reduce the possibility of injury or
death. While a reasonable person might have acted differently under the
circumstances, that does not mean that the defendant desired to harm
anyone or was indifferent to that possibility. On what basis does the
community condemn the defendant's state of mind as immoral in these
circumstances?
For example, the backhoe operator in the Knutson case did not oper-
ate the vehicle in a negligent manner. The negligence supporting the
conviction of the construction company was the company's failure to
have power cut off from nearby power lines while the backhoe was in
operation.86 However, OSHA regulations governing work in the vicinity
of electrical power lines gave the contractor the option of either cutting
off power or proceeding with the work while maintaining visual contact
with the power lines.87 Under management instructions the backhoe op-
erator complied with this second option, but he misjudged the distance
to the power lines and allowed his vehicle to come into contact with the
wires.
Was management's choice of one of two options permitted under
OSHA regulations morally blameworthy? The court placed emphasis on
the fact that the contract between the construction company and the
City of Oconomowoc required the contractor to notify the power com-
pany and cut off electricity when work was performed in the vicinity of
live wires.88 However, a breach of contract is not usually condemned as
a crime unless the underlying conduct is itself blameworthy. It is hard to
conclude that workplace procedures employed by the defendant in the
Knutson case were so outrageous as to be criminal under circumstances
where OSHA explicitly permitted such procedures.
Similarly, the newly trained driver in State v. Steenberg Homes, Inc.89
case operated his truck in a safe and prudent manner on the highway. 9°
However, he forgot to attach safety chains to the trailer before leaving
on what was his second day as a driver.91 The trailer came unattached
86. Richard Knutson, Inc., 537 N.W.2d at 429.
87. Id. at 428-429.
88. Id. at 429.
89. 589 N.W.2d 668 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998).
90. Id. at 670.
91. Id.
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and struck three bicyclists. By convicting the corporation of a crime
under these facts, the court essentially found the corporate manager to
be morally blameworthy because company procedures did not include a
safety checklist on which the driver could indicate that safety chains had
been attached in preparation for the day's assignment.92 This failure was
deemed blameworthy despite the fact that the driver had been trained in
the proper procedures over the course of a week and had practiced
hooking and unhooking safety chains without any problems.93
Maybe the institution of a safety checklist procedure would have pre-
vented the accident. Or maybe, despite such a procedure, it would still
be possible for a driver to check off that the safety chains were properly
installed without realizing that, in fact, they were not. Perhaps a two-
week training course would be better than a one-week course. Should
the moral condemnation of the community turn on such trivialities? The
problem with section 940.10 is that it allows conduct to be defined as
criminal on the basis of just such fine distinctions.
The second argument against corporate liability under the statute
flows from the first. When conduct that is not morally blameworthy is
prosecuted as homicide, it diminishes the moral opprobrium attached to
other homicides. Professor John Coffee summarized this viewpoint as
follows:
[I]f the criminal law is over used, it will lose its distinctive stigma.
... Once everything wrongful is-made criminal, society's ability to
reserve special condemnation for some forms of misconduct is ei-
ther lost or simply reduced to a matter of prosecutorial
discretion.94
In addition, if corporate defendants come to believe that there is nothing
that they can do to prevent being charged with crimes as a result of
work-site fatalities, then they (and their shareholders) will come to view
these crimes as merely one cost of doing business.95
92. Id. at 673-674.
93. Id at 670.
94. John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful" Mean "Criminal"?: Reflections on the Disap-
pearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. Rv. 193, 200-01 (1991).
95. Consider again the observations of Professor Coffee:
[Wjorkplace injuries are, to a degree, inevitable. As a result, some individuals must
engage in legitimate professional activities that are regulated by criminal sanctions; to
this extent, they become unavoidably 'entangled' with the criminal law. That is, they
cannot plan their affairs so as to be free from the risk that a retrospective evaluation of
their conduct, often under the uncertain standard of negligence, will find that they fell
short of the legally mandated standard.
Id. at 219-20.
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The amount of discretion given to prosecutors under the statute pro-
vides the third argument against its application to corporate defendants.
Charges are brought in the case of some work-site fatalities, but not all.
The criteria for distinguishing between corporate procedures found lack-
ing under the statute and procedures which are deemed adequate but
merely ineffective in preventing accidents is ambiguous and unknow-
able. Could Steenberg Homes really have foreseen that their training
and safety procedures would be found to support criminal liability?
Would a different prosecutor have viewed the same procedures differ-
ently? The attempt of the Waukesha County D.A. to apply the statute in
the case of a drunk driving accident following a company Christmas
party merely underscores the breadth of the prosecutorial discretion in-
herent in a crime premised upon negligent behavior.
Yet another policy argument against imposing corporate liability as a
result of a homicide by the negligent operation of a vehicle is that to do
so is to divert fault and moral condemnation away from the individuals
responsible for the act. No natural person was charged as a defendant in
either the Knutson case or the Steenberg Homes case. Yet each prosecu-
tion was premised upon the theory that an individual acting in a supervi-
sory or managerial position acted in a criminally negligent manner. It is
easy to hold a corporation vicariously liable for the acts of its employees,
and to minimize the impact that a conviction has upon the corporation
and its shareholders. However, if we are uncomfortable charging re-
sponsible employees with a crime under certain facts then we should also
hesitate to condemn the corporation. Contrast these cases with the reck-
less homicide prosecutions involving Film Recovery Systems and the
S.A. Healy Company. Individual corporate employees were charged in
the former case and the crew chief would have been charged in the latter
case had he not died in the explosion.96 If the conduct is truly criminal,
the existence of a corporate defendant should not divert the community
from punishing the natural persons who are responsible.
Finally, corporate criminal liability is unnecessary in this context be-
cause punitive damages in a civil suit are a better deterrent. If our pur-
96. The fact that the corporation was not charged with the death of the crew chief sug-
gests that the D.A. viewed the crew chief as criminally culpable. McCann, supra note 42, at
795. Criminal charges were not brought against the labworkers in the Chem-Bio prosecution
who failed to catch the cancer on the Pap smear slides, despite the opinion of an expert advis-
ing the D.A. that one of the cases was the worst misread of a Pap smear that she had ever
seen. Id. at 795-96. It is troubling that health care professionals could participate in such an
obviously deficient manner of reviewing slides without having to answer for the consequences
of their actions.
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pose is to encourage companies to take all reasonable measures to
protect their employees, then a $99 million judgment similar to the one
handed down in the Miller Park wrongful death suit will be far more
effective than the $10,000.00 statutory maximum fine in a reckless homi-
cide prosecution.97 The possibility that insurance might cover the verdict
should not concern us here, since any applicable insurance policy would
almost certainly limit its coverage to negligent acts. If the conduct is
truly negligent, so that insurance is available to pay a judgment, then the
conduct should not be subject to criminal penalties anyway.
VI. CONCLUSION: Tim FUTURE OF CoRPORATE LIABILITY FOR
WORK-RELATED FATALITIES IN WISCONSIN
It would appear that reckless homicide under section 940.02 is an
unlikely charge against Mitsubishi under the facts of the Big Blue acci-
dent. Construction accidents resulting in fatalities should not be charged
as reckless homicides unless the workers are exposed to an unusual or
outrageous danger on the job site. Reckless homicide should only be
charged against a construction company when the fatal occurrence falls
outside of the normal risks present on a job site. The job of a construc-
tion worker by its nature involves high altitudes, heavy machinery and
the ever-present possibility of human error.
It is true that Mitsubishi, through its supervisor Victor Grotlisch,
failed to verify safe wind speeds on the day of the fateful lift, ignored
concerns raised by the ironworkers, and fostered an environment that
stifled communication or dissent among the workers. However, no evi-
dence was presented at the civil trial that Grotlisch or any other Mitsub-
ishi employee chose to proceed in the face of a subjective appreciation of
the likelihood of a crane collapse under the prevailing wind conditions.
After all, if Mitsubishi employees had been aware of the true extent of
the risk, would they really have attempted the lift in the presence of
OSHA inspectors?
That does not mean that the accident was inevitable. Better monitor-
ing of wind speed might have meant that the lift was delayed. Perhaps
the lift might have been attempted using a different approach - one that
did not require the roof segment to be lifted quite so high before being
swung into place. It is undisputed that Mitsubishi could have taken addi-
tional steps that would have minimized (although not eliminated) the
likelihood of Big Blue collapsing. But one could make a similar argu-
97. Id. at 798. Civil litigation in the Chem-Bio case resulted in judgments totaling $11
million. Id. at 795.
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ment after almost any construction accident. Little purpose is served by
treating every construction accident as criminal if, with the benefit of
hindsight, it is deemed to have been preventable. Victor Grotlisch's fail-
ure to more closely monitor wind speed may constitute negligence, but it
does not indicate a subjective awareness of the risk of a collapse much
less exhibit the "utter disregard for human life" required to support a
charge of first degree reckless homicide.
However, criminally negligent conduct would be sufficient to support
a charge of homicide by negligent operation of a vehicle under section
940.10. As interpreted by the Wisconsin Court of Appeals in the Knut-
son case, the statutory language would appear to cover the collapse of
Big Blue. The evidence at the civil trial may be sufficient to establish
criminal negligence in the operation of the crane. Therefore, a criminal
prosecution of Mitsubishi would appear to be a very real possibility.
For the reasons discussed above, the wisdom of such a result can be
questioned. The Wisconsin legislature chose its words carefully when it
passed the statute prohibiting homicide by the negligent operation of a
vehicle but limiting potential defendants to natural persons. Undoubt-
edly the legislature meant what it said. It is likely that at some point the
Wisconsin Supreme Court will be called upon to revisit the question con-
sidered by the Court of Appeals in Knutson. At that time, the Court
should interpret the language of section 940.10 to preclude the prosecu-
tion of corporations.
The problem with such an interpretation is that it can also be applied
to the similar language in section 940.02. Similar to section 940.10, the
reckless homicide statute is also addressed to "whoever" causes the
death of "another" human being. A similar interpretation of the statu-
tory language would prevent a corporation from being charged with
reckless homicide in situations where death is a real and foreseeable
consequence of the nature of the workplace created by corporate man-
agement. Should we extend immunity from prosecution to corporations
under section 940.02 of the Criminal Code as well?
The indifference to life exhibited by the officials of S.A. Healy and
Film Recovery Systems should be obvious. In both cases management
knowingly exposed workers to hazardous conditions where they knew
that the loss of life or serious injury were very real possibilities. The
management of Chem-Bio was indifferent to the lives of the patients it
purportedly served. Officials of that company knew that a misdiagnosis
- with potentially fatal consequences - was almost inevitable given the
manner in which patient slides were reviewed. In these situations, man-
agement chose a course of conduct and an utter disregard for human life
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was evident in the choice they made. Reckless homicide prosecutions
would be appropriate. Of course, in these situations the individual re-
sponsible for the corporate action is equally responsible for the deviation
from societal norms reflected in the corporate conduct and should be
subject to criminal charges as well as the corporation.
Therefore, the choice facing the Wisconsin Supreme Court would
seem to be between finding a pretext for ignoring the language of the
negligent homicide provision of section 940.10 on the one hand, and
eliminating corporate liability for homicide altogether on the other. One
need not be a cynic to recognize that courts often ignore the plain lan-
guage of a statute. The decision of the Court of Appeals in Knutson
ignored the statutory language because the judges in the majority recog-
nized that a contrary interpretation would preclude corporate criminal
liability under not only this statute but also under all of the homicide
provisions of the Criminal Code. Certainly it is difficult to imagine a
legal system where a corporate employer is never criminally responsible
for a death caused by the actions (or inactions) of its employees. How-
ever, such immunity from prosecution is not only imaginable, it is defen-
sible in the context of work-site fatalities resulting from negligent
conduct.
Prosecuting the corporation for a single misjudgment or miscalcula-
tion in the performance of a complex and dangerous operation of heavy
machinery, under the theory of homicide through the reckless operation
of a vehicle, serves no valid purpose. If workplace conditions on the
whole do not exhibit a depraved indifference to human life, then it is
difficult to understand what society accomplishes by holding the corpo-
ration criminally responsible for the one-time misjudgment of its em-
ployees. Neither Victor Grotlisch nor the crew of Big Blue fully
appreciated the danger that the three ironworkers were being exposed to
on the day of the collapse. None of the employees involved chose to
ignore dangerous wind conditions. They should have known better, but
the point is that they did not know. Since the employee is not typically
charged as an individual in these negligent vehicular homicide cases,
how is it that the corporation - whose liability is entirely derivative of
the actions of the employee - can be viewed as morally culpable if the
employees are not? Section 940.10 of the Wisconsin Statutes, as cur-
rently interpreted, allows too many accidents like the Big Blue collapse
to be prosecuted as crimes under varying and ill-defined standards.
When called upon to interpret the crime of homicide by the negligent
operation of a vehicle in the future, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
should give effect to the plain language of the legislature and overrule
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the Knutson decision. At the same time, the Court should invite the
legislature to amend the reckless homicide statute, section 940.02, in or-
der to explicitly permit the continued prosecution of corporate defend-
ants under that statute. However, until such time as the legislature
revisits the issue of the appropriate scope of corporate liability for work-
site fatalities, the Court should assume that the legislature meant what it
said. The result may be that for a period of time Wisconsin finds itself
alone among the fifty states in rejecting the concept of corporate liability
for homicide in general. What is necessary is a rethinking of the circum-
stances under which corporate liability for workplace deaths makes
sense. The law should recognize that sometimes corporations adopt pol-
icies that are indifferent to the safety of employees and the public. But
the law should also recognize that sometimes an accident is just an acci-
dent. An examination of the facts and circumstances behind the collapse
of Big Blue demonstrates that the current treatment of corporate homi-
cide under the laws of Wisconsin fails to adequately distinguish between
these two vastly different scenarios.
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